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I

n order to put my thoughts in context, I begin by outlining recent Canadian
participation in the international sphere. I want to highlight that Canadian
Forces operations are not limited to "peacekeeping" as is often misunderstood, not
only on the international scene, but also sometimes at home. While Canada chose
not to be involved in the 2003 Iraq operation, it has been a fully committed memberin terms both of the lives of its soldiers, sailors and ainnen, including women, as
well as of "national treasure"- in the coalition and international efforts related to
what the United States, our dose neighbor to the south, has termed the "Global
War on Terror" or the "GWOT," and what we call the "Campaign Against Terrorism" or the "CAT."l I suppose this subtle use of different ter minology is part of
the reason this volume contains two other articles 2 authored by represen tatives of
nations that have participated in coalition operations with the United States. Together they illustrate the differing national approaches and understandings relating to participation in a common enterprise.
Regardless of how the conflict is termed. countering AI Qaeda requires a
multidisciplinary and multifaceted approach involving civilian and military intelligence agencies. policing. diplomacy and international engagement. as well as the
.. Brigadier General. Canadian Forces. The opinions expressed in th is article are solely those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the government of Canada.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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use of military forces. The use of military forces encompasses both domestic and
international operations. In this regard it should be noted that Canada does not
have the equivalent of the US Posse Comitatus Act.}Canadian military forces-naval,
land and air---<an be deployed to provide a wide variety of assistance to law enforcement operations, both within Canada and off our shores. 4
There has been significant debate about how to characterize the conflicts against
non-State actors, such as AI Qaeda, other terrorist groups and insurgent forces. This
includes categorizing such conflicts as being " not of an international character,"S
"international armed conflicts"6 and "internationalized internal armed conflicts."
From time to time the term "transnational" armed conflict has even crept into academic literature.' The Canadian approach has been that at a minimum Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions8 applies to operations in Afghanistan.
Canada, however, has avoided categorizing the transnational operations of AI
Qaeda, preferring to simply acknowledge that an "armed conflict" is in existence to
which humanitarian law applies regardless of whether operations occur on land, in the
air or on the high seas.9 Remember, however, that the famous Caroline case outlining
the basis for self-defense for States under international law involved the transborder
activities of a non-State actor against Canada. lo
Of course "war" is such an emotive term, particularly fo r international lawyers
who may have viewed the creation of the United Nations Charter as an end of
"war" in any legal sense. In fact ual terms, "war" very much continues to exist and
the conduct of "warfare" is what engages professional military forces, international
humanitarian law treaties and customary international law. As has been noted by
one Canadian academic institute, 95 percent of contem porary conflicts are "internal" to States. 11 As warfare changes from the industrial age to the information age
and perhaps fo urth-generation warfare, contemporary military operations have, as
the British General Sir Rupert Smith has noted, become the conduct of "war
amongst the people. "12 This trend away from the traditional idea of warfare being
"international armed conflict" between nation-States is presenting significant
challenges not only for us as military law practitioners, but also for our academic
colleagues and for essential stakeholders such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross (JCRe) and committed h uman rights non-governmental organizations. It may be fair to say that the effort in the post-World War II era to restrict the
recourse to war by States (jus ad bellum) means the rich body of conventional and
customary law (jus in bello) technically applies to its fullest extent to a significantly
decreasing type of conflict. J know the JCRe's 2005 Customary International Hu manitariatl Law study]} has garnered criticism from a variety of sources regarding
its methodology and some of its conclusions. 14 Indeed, there are parts of the study
with which J disagree;IS however, it remains a significant and, in many ways, a
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courageous undertaking at an essential time as operations appear to shift from a focus on international armed conflict to counterinsurgency. I keep a copy of the
study close to my desk and it is used regularly by Canadian Forces legal officers as
an important resource tool.
Since October 24, 200 1 when Canada acted "in the exercise of the inherent right
of individual and collective self defence in accordance with Article 51» of the
United Nations Charter in response to the armed attacks on the United States,
Canada has been a steadfast participant in conducting military operations against
the threats posed by AI Qaeda and the Taliban. 16 With our joint enterprise in the
North American Aerospace Defense Command, Canada and the United States
have worked in an integrated fashion to protect the skies over North America.
Canadian participation has seen the deployment of a significant portion of our
navy to the US Cen tral Command's maritime area of responsibility, including as
part of US Navy carrier strike groups and maritime patrol aircraft operations in
the Persian Gulf. We have also provided tactical airlift , infantry, special forces
and other units to coalition and International Security Assistance Force operations since the beginning of operations in Afghanistan, including the participation of an in fantry battle group in Operation Anaconda in 2002. Canada
presently has approximately 2,300 personnel operating in Regional Command
(South) centered on Kandahar. These include an in fantry battle group, co mbat
engineers, artillery, Leopard tanks, armored reconnaissance, an unmanned aerial
vehicle unit and operational mentor liaison teams working with the Afghanistan
army. A Canadian legal officer was deployed to work with our American colleagues in the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan mentoring
program in respect to the Afghan justice system. Further, another legal officer
will deploy shortly to the Canadian Operational Mentoring Liaison Team
mentoring the Afghan 205 Corps.
The cost of the mission has been high from a Canadian perspective. Fifty-seven
personnel, including our first female combat casualty (an artillery officer), have
been killed mostly in the last eighteen months. In addition, a Canadian Foreign Affairs officer was killed by an improvised explosive device. Over two hundred personnel have been wounded. As can be expected, the involvement of Canadian
Forces personnel in Afghanistan has caused considerable political and national debate. For example, the vote in Parliament in May 2006 to extend the mission in Afghanistan until February 2009 was 149 to 145 in favor of the extensionY
The operations in Afghanistan reflect a larger challenge facing all our nations,
that being the changing nature of warfare. The challenges presented by "counterinsurgency" warfare include, inter alia, the treatment of detainees, the application of
human rights norms, and targeting and resulting limitations on collateral damage.
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Historically, there are two legal issues that present themselves as "centers of gravity" impacting on the ability of democracies to wage military campaigns against insurgent forces. They are the issue of the treatment of detainees-and, more
specifically, the question of torture-and excessive injury and death to civilians
(collateral damage). The present campaign is no exception.
As an officer serving for a country that has signed Additional Protocol I (AP 1),18
you might expect that 1 would indicate that treaty is a reason for differing approaches to the conduct of coalition operations with non-party countries such as
the United States; however, it is hard to make that case. Some 85 percent of the
world's States have signed and ratified AP I and many of its provisions are accepted
as either customary international law or as a doctrinal basis for the conduct of operations. In other words, a general acceptance of AP I provisions is a matter of
"fact." The AP I provisions are integrated into the training and doctrine of Canadian Forces personnel and their involvement in non-AP I conflicts is not likely to
fundamentally change the way wars are fought. That is likely the case of other
NATO countries who are AP I countries. The most obvious example of this is the
widespread acceptance of the AP I, Article 57 precautionary measures and the
principle of "proportionality" in respect to targeting.
There are different legal obligations and interpretations of the law for Canadian
personnel than for American forces. An example is the 1997 Ottawa Convention
on anti-personnel mines. 19 That Convention clearly prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling, retention or transfer of anti-personnel mines, as
well as assisting, encouraging or inducing such activities. Canadian Forces personnel have specific direction setting out their obligations when they operate with
nations who are not parties to the Convention. We may not use anti-personnel mines
and cannot request, directly or indirectly, the protection of those mines. However,
Canadian Forces personnel can participate in combined operations with nonConvention States. There appear to have been no stumbling blocks, likely because
of a general lack of use of such mines in contemporary operations; the relatively
large nwnber of countries, including within NATO, who have ratified the Convention; and the general awareness by our personnel of their obligations. 2o
It is simply a fact of coalition operations that nations will often take different approaches to interpreting the law. For example, my experience has been that European
nations are more directly impacted by the human rights framework associated with
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights than non-European countries,
such as Canada and the United States. Further, from time to time we must deal
with the different way that civil-law-trained and common law lawyers look at a
problem. Again, my experience has been that civil law lawyers will usually approach a problem first from the context of the treaty law provisions, while common
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law lawyers read "black letter" law in the context of case law and customary intemationallaw. Although the approach can be different, we often end up at the same place.
There can also be differences with countries with similar legal systems, although not
as many differences as may be the perceived wisdom. For example, the US interpretation of "military objective," to the extent that it includes an enemy's "war sustaining
capability," is broader than that of most States, including Canada. However, it should
also be noted that Canada entered a reservation to Additional Protocol I that states,
" [T]he military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to theadvantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the attack." From a Canadian perspective, targets would not be limited to
military forces and could include strategic targets such as rail yards, electric power
grids, oil refineries, lines of communication, bridges and supply routes. To the extent,
however, that the US wording would include attacks on exports that may be the source
of financial resources for a belligerent, it could very well present, as Professor Oinstein
has noted, "a slippery slope" in which every economic activity might be considered as
indirectly sustaining the war effort.2l It is likcly in this context during a traditional international armed conflict that Canadian and American approaches would differ.22
A greater challenge in contemporary operations is detennining the role and desired
effect of the strategic use of airpower. Comparing the 1991 Gulf conflict and the 2003
Iraq invasion, it would appear that a purely «strategic" approach had curried less favor
in the overall planning of the latter campaign.2) It is a more significant issue when one
considers how strategic strikes would realistically impact on a non-State-actor enemy.
A problem with the application of strategic airpower is that in practice it appears not to
have lived up to the hopes of its most ardent proponents. It is even less likely to have a
significant impact during "small wars."
As is noted by James Corum and Wray Johnson, the most effective use of airpower
in opposing insurgents and terrorists conducting a low-level guerrilla war is the use of
"indirect" means such as reconnaissance and transport.24 Issues related to bombing-even with a tactical focus-can raise more profound and challenging questions:
In much of the world, terrorism is seen as the unique weapon of the poor and fanatic;
airpower is seen as the symbolic weapon of the West- the means by which the wealthy
and advanced countries can bully the poor and weak countries. ThUs, bombing is
automatically viewed in the Third World as cruel and heavy-handed. This creates a
paradox that policymakers today do not seem willing to address. While airpower is
often the most effective means to strike at insurgents and terrorists, its use will
immediately provoke outcry and protest in many quarters of Western society and
throughout most of the Third World In short, there is a political price to pay.2S
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As Corum and Johnson state, "Bombing civilians, or targeting insurgents and terrorists in urban areas with resulting civilian casualties, generally works to the propaganda
advantage of the rebels. "26
The issue of "collateral damage" is as important in Afghanistan as it is in Iraq. The
Afghan government has increasingly expressed concern over both civilian deaths and
the manner in which searches are conductedF NATO itself has recognized the issue of
collateral damage as one of the most important ones it faces 28 and Jane's has recently
concluded that continued civilian casualties will increasingly impact on Afghan support for international forces. 29 The question remains as to how members of a coalition
measure collateral damage and ultimately the emphasis that is to be placed on the
"right to life" of uninvolved civilians. This, in tum, raises fundamental questions regarding the applicability of human rights nonns in the interpretation of international
humanitarian law.
From a legal perspective, resolving the interface between the law governing armed
conflict and h uman rights law may be the most significant challenge facing operational
lawyers of all our nations. We are trained and schooled in State-on-State conflict and
struggle over issues such as how collateral damage is to be assessed when it results from
the reverberating o r "knock on" effects of attacks against electrical grids. In the threeblock wars,JO occupations and other complex security situations of the twenty-first
centwy, military forces are confronted with fighting dangerous, perfidious and exceedingly violent armed groups, while at the same time interfacing with a civilian population who may oppose or support the insurgent fo rces. This raises questions of
whether assessments of collateral damage under these circumstances are impacted by
the h uman rightsllaw enforcement notions of "capture rather than kill" and a more
strict assessment of proportionality that dem ands operations be "planned and cond ucted in such a way as to avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible, any risk to
the lives of the [civilians[."31
While there has been no definitive artirulation of the degree to which h uman rights
law impacts on Canadian Forces international operations, it is d ear that the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapotls32 and WalP3cases have determined that
human rights law continues to operate during armed conflict, subject to the application of humanitarian law as a lex specialis. Further, it is unlikely that the Canadian position would ignore Comment No. 31 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
which, while not binding as a matter oflaw, would be persuasive.34 That Comment indicates that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)35
would apply in situations where "the rules of international humanitarian law are
applicable.")6
While the Canadian approach to accepting whether hum an rights norms can
apply to international o perations may be different than that of the United States,
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the practical effect is likely the same, particularly when the lex specialis of the laws
governing anned conflict is applied. Canada has accepted the application of human
rights-based norms regarding the treatment of detainees reflected in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 7S of Additional Protocol I (which itself reflects the ICCPR norms). This approach would appear to resonate with that
taken by the US Supreme Court in Hamdan. 37
More difficult and pressing questions for many of our military forces regarding
the application of human rights norms relate to the extraterritorial reach of domestic courts and what, if any, impact those norms may have on the use offorce. Many
Western nations are confronted with litigation regarding the extraterritorial application of human rights (or civil rights) to matters relating to armed conflict. This can
occur for a number of reasons, including the complex nature of the campaigns
against terrorism and non-State entities, and the relative weakness of accountability frameworks under humanitarian law in comparison to human rights law. The
impact of "globalization " cannot be discounted; we live and fight in a far more interconnected world that is breaking down previous boundaries. This may simply
be one more casualty of the information age.
Domestic courts in the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human
Rights have struggled with this issue. Canada is no exception. Presently, there is litigation in our Federal Court commenced by Amnesty International Canada and a
provincial civil liberties association challenging the transfer of detainees taken in
Afghanistan to Afghan authorities on the basis of a claim that they are subjected to
torture. The application is not only focused on the Afghan treatment of detainees
but also states that" [t Jhere are also substantial grounds to believe that the United
States of America is engaged in cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment of detainees, including torture, which is contrary to assurances the US has given to other
governments, including Canada."38 The applicants are relying not only on international law, but also claim that Canada's domestic Charter of Rights and Freedoms
applies to the transfer of detainees outside of Canada in other countries. I will not
say anything further as the matter is before the courts, but this is yet another indication of how human rights claims, induding domestic law, has the potential to
impact on contemporary operations.
As I have already indicated, the reach and effect of human rights norms are not
limited to the issue of the handling of detainees. This is evidenced in the recent Israeli
Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, decision, termed as the Targeted Killing case. 39 The Court applied the human rights law principle of preferring
arrest over killing as "the means that should be employed" even when the "target"
is someone taking a direct part in hostilities.40The position that a civilian cannot be
attacked at such time as he or she is taking part in hostilities "ifless harmful means
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can be employed" is held to be based on "internal laW' of the StateY The rule is
not an absolute as its application is linked to the degree of control exercised by the
military. Further, specific reference is made to the possibility that the option of arrest may not exist at all where "at times it involves a risk so great to the lives of the
soldiers. "42
The application of this case may be somewhat limited by the specific situation
regarding occupation facing Israeli authorities. Further, it is not dear how it would
be applied in a struggle against organized armed groups in a more traditional confli ct setting. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this "blended" approach is that,
notwithstanding the reliance on human rights law, there remains substantial resonance with humanitarian law. For example, it is possible to contemplate a scenario
in a built-up urban area controlled by the security forces where an attempt to neutralize relatively low-level insurgents could lead to a detennination that even under
the humanitarian law principle of proportionality (i.e., taking "all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injUly to civilians and damage to civilian objects"43) the result would be a decision to capture rather than kill an
opponent.
In the conduct of coalition operations there is the potential for considerable
misunderstanding among the "partners." One such issue that immediately strikes
me is the Canadian approach to the use of force in the defense of property. Put
simply, the use of deadly force to defend property generally is not permitted. This
arose out of the "Somalia Affair," where Canadian troops fired on Somalis who
ran away when discovered attempting to breach the wire to steal property. As I
once explained to one of our soldiers, we do not permit the killing of people for
stealing a watch even if it is right off your arm. However, we have, for operations
short of armed conflict, provided greater authority to use force to protect designated mission-essential property. In respect to combat operations, the use of force
is largely governed by the laws governing armed conflict, which permit the use of
force to destroy and defend property under appropriate circumstances. Indeed,
our rules of engagement have been quite robust throughout the conduct of operations since 200 1.
Finally, I want to briefly address investigations in a coalition environment. This
is taking up an increasing amount of commander and legal officer time in an operating environment that demands greater accountability. It has reached the point
where additional training is provided for Canadian legal officers in this area. From
a Canadian perspective this has included '"'blue-on-blue" engagements. One exampie is the friendly fire incident of April 17,2002 at Tarnak Fann where a US Air
Force F-16 mistakenly killed four and wounded eight Canadian soldiers. In
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September 2006 there was a tragic incident in which a US A-IO Warthog called in
to provide dose air support for a Canadian in fantry company in Afghanistan killed
one soldier and wounded thirty. There was a further incident at Forward Operating Base Robinson in Afghanistan where both a US and a Canadian soldier were
killed during a firefight. That case is being investigated as a possible "blue-on-blue"
incident. In each case, the cooperation between US and Canadian authorities has,
from my perspective, been exceptional. The air incidents have involved both joint
US-Canada investigations (Canadian-American copresidents) and Canadian national inquiries. While the most recent investigations are still being finalized, it is
dear that this cooperative effort has had a positive effect so far on interoperability,
as well as public perception.
In summary, coalition operations present challenges, but none of them to date
have been true "show stoppers. " As a general comment, it would appear that one of
the strengths of international law and treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions, is
that they provide a common reference for all participants. As nations committed to
the rule of law, this common understanding, even when impacted by national interpretations, has held all our countries in good stead. It does not mean that there
will be no differences, however; the threats we face are global, which in turn demand international cooperation.
Notes
1. See Kenneth Watkin, Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian
LAw Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted Killing, 15 DUKE JOURNAL

OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAw 281 , 291-94 (2005).
2. Neil Brown, Issues Arising from Coalition Operatiom: An Operational Lawyer's Perspective, and Vicki McConachie, Coalition Operations: A Compromise or an Accommodntion, which
are Chapters Xl and Xli , respectively, in this volume, at 225 and 235.
3. 18 US Code sec. 1385(2000).
4. The use of the armed forces in support oflaw enforcement is set out in both statutes, i.e.,
The Emergencies Act, R.S., Ch. 22 (4th Supp. 1985) and the National Defence Act, R.S., Ch. N-5
( 1985) and by the exercise of the Crown prerogative, i.e., Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions, P.e. 1993-624 (Mar. 30, 1993).
5. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-96 (2006), available at http://www
.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf, at 66-68.
6. The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Government oflsraei et aI.,
HCJ 769/02 (Dec. 13,20(6).
7. See Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical Warfare from til e Perspective of Hunumitarian Law and
HumaniMrian Action, 87 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 149, 154-56 (2005);
Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Cilallenges from tile QWaron
Terror," FLETCHER FORUM OF WORW AFFAIRS, Summer/Fall 2003, at 55, available at http:"
www.icrc.org/Web/engisiteengO.nsflhtmlalIJ5PWELF/SFile/Rona_terror.pd( (last visited Apr.
17,2008).

259

Coalition Operations: A Canadian Perspective
8. Conven tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Anned
Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;Convention for the AmI'·
lioration of the Condition of Wo unded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Anned Forces at Sea
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
P risoners of War art. 3,Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convenrion Relative to the
P rotection of Civilian Pe rsons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.$.
287, all reprinted in DocUMENTS ON THE LAwS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
3d ed. 2(00) at 197,222, 244 and 301, respectively.
9. This does not mean th at the law enforcement regime does not apply where appropriate.
For exam ple, in Canada terrorist activity is dealt wi th under Canadian domes tic law. It h as
included the arrest of terrorism suspects alleged to be involved in planning a bom b attack that
was "poten tially th ree times more devastating that the Oklahoma City bom bing." See Sasha
Nagy, Massive Terror Attack Averted: RCMP, GLOBEANDMAILCOM, June 3, 2006, http://
www.thegiobeandmail.comJselVlet/story/RTGAM.20060603.wwarrants0603_3IBNStory/National/
home.
10. See The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, WebsttT-Ashburton Treaty - The Carolille
Case, http ://W.WW.yale.edullawweb/avalonld iplomacylbritainlbr-1842d.htm (last visited Apr.
17,2008).
11. HUMAN SECURlTY CENTRE, H UMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND PEACE IN THE
21ST CENTURY 23 (2005), available at http://www.humansecurityreport.info/HSRl005]DF/
Partl.pdf.
12. RUPERT SMITH, THE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
(2005). See also THOMAS x. HAMMJ'.S, THE SUNG AND THE STONE 1-15 (2006) (for a discussion
of the four genera tions of warfare).
13. JEAN-MARIE H ENCKAERTS & LOUISE DoSWALO- BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
H UMANITARIAN LAW xxix (2005).
14. See, e.g., Timothy LH. McCormack, An Australian Perspective 011 the ICRC Customary
International Humanitarian LawStudy, in T HE LAw OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WEAPONS
AND THE USE OF FORCE 81 (An thony M . H elm ed., 2006) (VoL 82, US Naval War College Inter·
national Law Studies); Yoram Dinstein, Tile ICRCCustomary International Humanitarian Law
Study, in id. at 99.
15. See Kenneth Watkin, 21st Century and International Humanitarian Law: Status Quo or
Change!, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: ExPLORlNG THE FAULTLlNJ'.S 265
(Michael N. Schmitt and Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
16. See Kirby Abbott, "TtTrorists: Criminals, Combatants or. . . ?" The QUesti011 of Combatanry, in CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw, THE MEASURFS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: EFFEC1"lVENESS, FAIRNESS AND VALIDITY 366, 372 (2004) (for reference to the Letter to
President of the UN Security Council from th e Canadian Ambassador to th e UN, October 24,
2001).
17. umadll's Stay in Afglumistan Extended by 2 Years, CBCNEWS.CA, May 17, 2006, http://
www.cbc.ca!story/canadaJnational12006/05/17/afghandebate051 72006.htmL
18. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 10
the Protection of Victims of International Anned Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 8, at 422 [hereinafter Additional Pro·
tocol 1].
19. Conven tion on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, P roduction and Transfer of
Anti· Personnei Mines and on T heir Dest ruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1507, reprillted in DocUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 8, at 648.

260

Kenneth W . Watkin
20. See Watkin, supra note I, at 289-90.
21. YORAM DIN STEIN, THE CONDUer OF HOSTlUTIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFUCf 87 (2004) .
22. Watkin, supra note I, at 301-309 (for a discussion of the American and Canadian ap.
proaches toward defining "military objectives").
23. See Rebecca Gran t, The Redefinition ofAirpower, 86 AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, Oct. 2003, at
32, available at http://www.afa.orglmagazine/oct2003/1003strategic.pdf.
The strategic air campaign of Operation lraqi Freedom was guided by a philosophy
wholly differen t from what had come before. It was one of a handful of distinct air
battles being waged by the air component. Its goals came directly from the broad joint
campaign objectives articulated by Rumsfeld and Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander,
US Central Command. It was not crafted to overturn the regime in a single night or to
send messages. Planners made no attempt to lace together clever patterns of air strikes
in hopes of breaking the "will" of the people or deflating the regime by desttoying
categories ofUstrategic" targets it held most dear.
Id. at 36.
24. JAMES CORUM & WRAY JOHNSON, AlRPOWER IN SMALL WARS 427 (2003) .
25. Id. at 429-30.
26. Id. at 429.
27. See Karzai Anger over Civilian Deaths, BBCNews, May 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.ukl
2/hi/south_asia/661578I.stm (~The president told Nato and coalition commanders that the
patience of the Afghan people is wearing thin with the continued killing of innocent civilians,~ a
statement from his office said. "Civilian deaths and arbitrary decis ions to search people's houses
have reached an unacceptable level and Afghans cannot put up with it any longer").
28. See Sarah Holewinski, Fixing the Collateral Damage, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
Mar. 7, 2007, at 8, available at http://www.ih t.com/artidesJ2oo7/03/07/opinion/edholewin.php.
29. See Afghan Support for Coalition Forces Declines, JANE'S, http://www.janes.comlsecurity/
internationaCsecurity/news/iwr/iwr070507 _I_n.shtmi.
As NATO and US forces take the offensive to the militants, violence has increased
across the country, and subsequently civilian casualties can also be expected to increase,
despi te the best efforts to avoid them. This will increasingly damage support for
in ternational forces in Afghanistan and further anti-US and anti-NATO
demonstrations can be expected to occur, both locally in Herat and in other population
centres across the country.
[d.
30. SeeCharies e. Krulak, The StrategicCorpoml: Leadership in the Three Block War, MARlNE
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1999, at 28, available at http://www.au.af.millau/awclawcgate/usmclstrategic
_corporal.htm (UThree_block wars" consist of three major operations occurring simulta·
neously within an urban environment: humanitarian assistance, peace operations and combat
operations).
31. Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1751.
32. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory O pinion, 1996 I.e.]. 226,
para. 25 (J uly 8).
33. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.e.}. 136, para. 106 (July 9).
34. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, General
Comment No. 31 {SO], The Nature of the General Legal Obligatiou Imposed on States Parties to

261

Coalition Operations: A Canadian Perspective
tire Covenant para. 10, U.N. Doc. CCPRfCI21/ Rev.I/Add.13 (May 26, 2004), available at
http://www.unhchr.chJtbsldoc.nsfJ(Symbol)/CCPR.C.21.Rev.l.Addl3.En?Opendocument [hereinafter General Comment 31] (which indicates State parties, including their Kforces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or
peace-enforcement operat ion, n must respect and ensW"e the rights laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "to anyone within the power or effective control
of that State Party. even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.n Further, that
Covenant "applies situations of anned conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicablen).
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302,
reprinted in 6 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 383 (1966).
36. General Comment 31, supra note 34, para. 11 .
37. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006), available at http://
www.s upremecourtus.gov/opinionsJ05pdf/05-184.pdf(A plW"ality of the Court stated: "Although the United States ded ined to ratify Protocol I, its objections were not to Article 75
thereof. Indeed, it appears that the Government 'regard[s[ the provisions of Article 75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled"').
38. Amnesty International Canada and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Chief
of Defence Staff for the Canadian Forces et aI., amended Notice of Application T -324-074 (Feb.
21,2007).
39. The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Government of Israel et al.,
HJC 769/02 (Dec. 13,2(06).
40. Id., para. 40.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Add itional Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 57(2)(a).

262

